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Hirschhorn: Discounted Mini-Tender Offers: A Fraudulent Business Scheme

NOTE
DISCOUNTED MINI-TENDER OFFERS:
A FRAUDULENT BUSINESS SCHEME
I.

INTRODUCTION

Remarkably, thousands of investors are selling their stock in
companies for less than they could sell them on the open market. Why
would anyone make such a radical decision? These decisions are not
being made by foolish investors; rather, they are the result of fraudulent
and deceptive practices by manipulative "businesspersons" who are

employing a relatively new investment tool known as mini-tender
offers.'
Mini-tender offers are a variation of the popular investment tool
known as a tender offer.2 In the sense that investors recognize tender
offers as takeover methods, the term mini-tender offer is actually a
misnomer because it does not effectuate the complete takeover of a
company. Simply stated, a mini-tender offer consists of an acquiror who
seeks to buy up to 5%3 (usually far less than what is required to take over
a company) of a target company's shares at a price less than what the
1. Because they are a relatively new phenomena, a standard sp-Iling does not exist for
"mini-tender offers." Other spellings, all of which encompass the subject of this Note, includ:
"minitender offers" and "mini tender offers." This Note uses the most often cited splling, "minitender offers."
2. A tender offer occurs when an individual or group offers to buy shares of a publicly held
company, usually at a price above the current market value and usually to acquire control of the
corporation. See FR. REP. No. 90-1711, at 2 (1968); see also infra Part ILA (discussing tests used
to determine when a tender offer exists). Tender offers, as we know them today, originated in Great
Britain where they were known as takeover bids. See 5 Louis LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAXN. SECURITES
REGULATION 2128-29 (3d ed. 1990). As investors adopted this type of takeover method in the
United States, they became known as tender offers. See id. For the purposes of this Note, this
takeover method will be referred to as a tender offer.
3. Five percent is the threshold level to trigger disclosure requirements under the WVilliams
Act. See infra Part ILB.2.
4. A target company is a company that is being sought after through a proxy contest or a
tender offer. See KENNETH W. CLARKSON Er AL., WEST'S BuSLiNESS LW: Tf..z: CAsES: LEGAL.
ETHICAL, REGULATORY, AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMTENr 853 (6th ed. 1995); WtLU.mt A.
KLEIN & J. MARK RAMSEYER, BusINEss ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY. PARTNERSIIIFS. Ariz
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security trades for on the open market.5 This can be accomplished by one
of two methods. In one instance, the bidder may offer to buy shares at
less than the market price, and, once the shareholder tenders, the bidder
will flip the shares at the current market price.6 Alternatively, the bidder
may buy the shares at the market price, but will not consummate the
offer unless the market price increases between the time the shareholder
tenders and the buy date. 7 It is significant to acknowledge at the outset
that a shareholder who tenders his or her shares in a mini-tender offer
retains no withdrawal rights as he or she would in a tender offer.8 The
practical effect of this deceptive practice is that the average shareholder
has his or her investment "stolen" right from under him or her and the
mini-tender offeror profits hundreds of thousands of dollars in a matter
of days, possibly even hours.9
A fundamental understanding of tender offers is crucial to analyze
the implications of mini-tender offers, empathize with the exploited
shareholders, and understand the proposed solutions. A tender offer, as it
is commonly known, is a transaction that consists of a company that
wishes to acquire a target company, and does so by soliciting the target
company's shareholders to tender their shares in exchange for some
consideration, usually stock in the acquiring company or cash.' ° Perhaps
because of their instant popularity, proper regulatory schemes for tender
offers have been a subject of great dispute since their inception.
When Congress ratified the Williams Act in 1968, its primary
objective was to "close a significant gap in investor protection" left open
by the existing federal securities laws concerning tender offers." The
"gap" referred to by Senator Williams illustrates that previous federal
securities laws regulated many of the most common takeover methods

CORPORATIONS 485 (3d ed. 1997). There are several characteristics common to a desirable target
company: weak management, widespread stock ownership, large blocks of stock in institutional
hands, a broad geographic shareholder distribution, a high book liquidation value in comparison to
the market value, and minimal or no outstanding debt. See 1 ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR., TENDER
OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 3-4 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
5. See Barbara Martinez, How the Master of Minitenders Makes It Work, WALL ST.J., Jan.
28, 1999, at Cl.
6. See id.
7. See Commission Guidance on Mini-Tender Offers and Limited Partnership Tender Offers,
Exchange Act Release No. 43,069, 72 SEC Docket 2245, 2248 (July 31, 2000) [hereinafter
Interpretive Release].
8. See id.
9. See Martinez, supranote 5.
10.

See LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW 125 (1998).

11.

113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
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except cash tender offers." As Congress became aware of the deceptive
practices being implemented in cash tender offer transactions, it
designed the Williams Act to regulate takeover methods evenhandedly."
Notwithstanding the enforcement of the Williams Act and the regulation
of cash tender offers, fraudulent mini-tender offers are currently being
employed throughout the securities industry.'4
One of the primary goals of the federal securities laws is to end
current, and prevent future, fraudulent activities in the marketplace' But
what is the threshold level that the fraudulent activities must reach
before Congress, or the agency empowered by it, in this case the
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"), vill act to prevent and end
such practices? History has illustrated that it sometimes takes exorbitant
losses before Congress examines a particular situation and decides
whether federal regulation is the best solution. One of the most notable
examples illustrating Congress' failure to act proactively is the Great
Depression and the subsequent enactment of the Securities Act of 1933"
("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934"' ("Exchange
Act").' 9 Investors had lost billions of dollars before Congress decided
federal intervention was necessary to prevent people from being further
defrauded and exploited.,
Tender offers quickly became the most popular and cost effective
method for taking over companies.2 ' However, along with their
popularity came executives who took advantage of the opportunity to
make millions of dollars on this unregulated device, while defrauding
investors. Although the Williams Act put a halt to many of these
deceptive practices, spurious "businesspersons" have recently learned
how to exploit a loophole in the Williams Act. This loophole exists in
§ 14(d) of the Exchange Act where the law specifically fails to require a
tender offeror to file a tender offer statement for any tender offer
12. See S. REP. No. 90-550, at 4 (1967). Common takeover methods that were regulated by
federal securities laws prior to the Williams Act included stock for stock exchanges, proxy contests,
and stock tender offers. See id. at 2-3.
13. See 113 CONG. REc. 855 (statement of Sen. illiams).
14. See Martinez, supranote 5.

15. See discussion hifra Part ILB.
16. See ALLAN B. AFrERMAN, SEC REGULAT ON OF PUBuC COmPANIES 6 t 1995).
17. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ T7a77bbbb (1994)).
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404.48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§§ 78a-7811(1994)).
19. See ArERmLAN, supra note 16, at 6-7.
20. See id.
21. See S. REP. No. 90-550, at 2 (1967).
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acquiring less than 5% of the target company's securities." This Note
does not suggest that all tender offers, regardless of size, should be
required to file a tender offer statement; rather, as set forth in Part V,
other solutions are much more viable.
During the writing of this Note, the SEC issued an interpretive
release concerning mini-tender offers, 23 however, this interpretive release
does not provide adequate measures to stop the fraudulent practices
associated with mini-tender offers. The time is ripe for the SEC to issue
new regulations and put a stop to fraudulent mini-tender offers.
Fraudulent "businesspersons" have already cheated hundreds of
companies and several thousand investors through the use of misleading
mini-tender offers.24 It is time that the SEC ends these practices before
corporate America is further exploited.
Part II of this Note examines the development of tender offers and
reviews relevant sections of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and
the Williams Act. Part III discusses the development, process, and
significance of mini-tender offers. Part IV examines the SEC's reaction
to mini-tender offers and its lack of efficacy. In conclusion, Part V
proposes two solutions to the problems associated with mini-tender
offers: (1) that the SEC pass a regulation that illustrates violations of
§ 14(e) of the Exchange Act, and (2) that the SEC pass a regulation
requiring brokerage firms to scrutinize mini-tender offers for reasonably
suspect information vis-A-vis § 14(e) of the Exchange Act. As discussed
in further detail below, these remedies would likely work best if used in
conjunction with one another rather than independently.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TENDER OFFERS

How can a shareholder have an impact on a corporation's policy if
he or she is unhappy with the current management? Does a shareholder
truly have the ability to replace management? Truth be told, the vast
majority of shareholders do not own enough shares of a corporation to
make even the slightest difference in the outcome of shareholder votes,
much less be in a position to replace management.' Thus, how is the
shareholder supposed to impact a corporation's policy or replace
management?

22.
23.
24.
25.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1994).
See Interpretive Release, supra note 7, at 2245.
See discussion infra Part ll.C.
See KLEIN & RAMSEYER, supra note 4, at 484.
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One who wishes to overthrow the management of a corporation
generally has two options available: a proxy contest or a tender offer."
Proxy contests are fights to obtain control of shareholder votes
Although they were relatively common in the 1950s, they soon gave
way to the more efficient method of tender offers.: Purposefully, a
concrete definition of a tender offer does not exist, but it generally
"consists of a bid by an individual or group to buy shares of a
company-usually at a price above the current market price."' 3
Investors quickly adopted the tender offer as the preferred takeover
method because of the many advantages it has over the traditional proxy
contest:" Among the numerous, there are two principal advantages.!
First, and perhaps the predominant reason why tender offers became so
popular, is that cash tender offers were not regulated in any manner
comparable to the proxy contest prior to the Williams Act. '
Second, acquiring shares through a tender offer is generally much
faster than through a proxy contest. In a tender offer, the offeror has
considerable flexibility in deciding how long, or short, to keep the tender
offer open.' This affords the target company less time to prepare a
defense. 6 In other words, because the tender offeror does not need to
acquire proxies from the shareholders of the target company, the offeror
can commence the offer in virtual secrecy, thereby taking advantage of
the element of surprise. 7 On the other hand, in a proxy contest, the
management of a target company has more notice that someone is trying
26. See id. at 485.

27. See id. at 484-85. Because a shareholder seeking a change with respect to managemznt or
any other issue generally does not own a sufficient percentage of shares to make a difference in the
outcome of a shareholder vote, a shareholder needs the support of many other shareholders to obtain

the outcome he or she wants. See id. Consequently, a shareholder will solicit proxies from other
shareholders. See id. Obtaining the proxies will permit the shareholder to vote on izhalf of the other
shareholders, and if enough proxies are obtained, the shareholder may make a difference in the
outcome of a vote. See id. Like tender offers, proxy contests are subject to regulation by the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act'). See id. at 485.
28. See hi.
29. See Takeover Bids: Hearing on H.R. 14,475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomn. on
Commerce & Fin. of tihe House Conwz. on Interstate & Foreign Comm., 90th Cong. 18 (1963)
[hereinafter Takeover Bids].

30. H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 2 (1968).
31.

See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supranote 2, at 2129.

32. See id.at 2129-30.
33. See id.; see also infra Part ILB (discussing the development of federal securities

regulations prior to the Williams Act).
34. See 5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supranote 2, at 2130.

35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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to overthrow it, thereby affording it more time to prepare a defense."

With their increasing popularity, it was simply a matter of time before
the courts would take up the matter of tender offers. However, as
examined below, determining when a tender offer exists has proved to
be no easy task for the courts.
A.

Tender Offer Defined

In accordance with congressional intent, a concrete definition of a
tender offer does not exist.39 While some texts attempt to define a tender
offer in a few sentences, the various definitions only state some general
characteristics common to most tender offers.40 The courts' struggle to
determine when a tender offer exists, and when it does not, is further
evidence that the definition of a tender offer is unclear.4

In light of their struggle, many courts have relied on one of two
tests to determine whether a tender offer exists. One test was developed
by the SEC 2 and was adopted in the well-known case of Wellman v.

38. See id. In a proxy contest, a dissident shareholder has two options available to access
shareholders. First, the dissident could have the corporation mail the proxies to the shareholders for
them at the dissident's expense. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (2000). Second, the dissident could
request the shareholder list from the corporation and mail the proxies out him or herself. See id.
Since it is likely that management will not be amenable to the dissident's position, it is not likely to
hand over the shareholder list. See KLEIN & RAMSEYER, supra note 4, at 493. Consequently, the
dissident is forced to have the corporation mail the proxies and therefore gives the corporation
additional time to prepare a defense to the proxy contest. See S. REP. No. 90-510, at 2 (1967)
(discussing how cash tender offers allow a bidder to act in complete secrecy so that a target has no
opportunity to implement a defense). Notably, many state securities laws require a corporation to
hand over the shareholder list to a shareholder that asks for it, subject to certain constitutional
requirements. See Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1991). Regardless, the corporation
is still on notice that someone is trying to overthrow them.
39. See Takeover Bids, supra note 29, at 18.
40. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1480 (7th ed. 1999) (defining tender offer as "[a]
public offer to buy a minimum number of shares directly from a corporation's shareholders at a
fixed price, usu[ally] at a substantial premium over the market price, in an effort to take control of
the corporation").
41. See, e.g., Heine v. Signal Cos., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 91,311, at 91,320 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1977) (stating that there is no definitive line between
negotiating a private action and a public tender offer). A tender offer is purposely undefined so the
courts can analyze it on an ad hoc basis. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 598
(5th Cir. 1974); see also generally Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARM. L. REV. 1250 (1973) (discussing the development of
defining the term tender offer).
42. See Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed, Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,145, at 96,148 n.3 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1979). The Hoover court adopted the test
developed by the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") by application. See id. at 96,150.
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Dickinson.43 The second test was developed in S-G Securities, Inc. v.
FuquaInvestment Co.44 In analyzing the two tests, it is useful to set forth

a brief synopsis of the facts of each case.
1. The Wellnan Test
In Wellman, the Board of Directors ousted defendant Dickinson

from his position as Chairman of the Board at Becton, the corporation at
issue.45 In an attempt to apply pressure on management and regain
control of Becton via a tender offer, Dickinson sought financial
assistance from Sun Company, Inc. ("Sun").:
To acquire the 34% of Becton's stock that Sun desired, Sun
determined it was best to buy the 15% held by Dickinson and a few
others and to conduct a limited solicitation of Becton's institutional

shareholders for the remainder 7 Sun concluded that this method would
be the quickest and quietest.' The offer provided two tender options to
the shareholders: $45 per share with no recourse should the final offer

price be higher, or $40 per share with the right to receive the highest
price paid to any solicitee thereafter. 9

After acquiring the initial 15%, Sun initiated telephone solicitations
of institutional investors for the remaining shares.15 Solicitors informed
each of the prospective solicitees that no transaction was final unless
Sun acquired 20% of the shares, notified them of the two-tier price
structure, and told them that a hurried response was essential."

43. 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 682 F2d 355 (2d Cir 1982). The District Court
initially adopted the test. See id. at 824.
44. 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978).
45. See IVellman, 475 F. Supp. at 799 (stating that Dickinson was ousted for his desire "to
bring about a change in management" at Becton and how he "was deposed as chairman and nudged

out the back door with the title of Honorary Chairman" by other members of the company's board).
46. See id. at 805-06.
47. See id. at 805.
48. See id. at 806.
49. See id. at 808. This type of tender offer is lmown as a coercive tender offer.See Gregg H.
Kanter, Comment, Judicial Review of Antitakeover Devices Employed in the 'oncoercire Tender
Offer Context: Making Sense of the Unocal Test, 138 U. PA. L REV. 225. 228 n.20 (1989). In a
coercive tender offer, shareholders are coerced into selling their shares at a price they belieive is
inadequate because once the offeror obtains the percentage of shares he or she desires, he or sh. will
no longer have an incentive to offer a premium to the remaining shareholders. See id. Vh1ile
coercive tender offers were legal at the time of WeIlman, SEC Rule 14d-10 has effe"ively rendzred
them illegal. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (2000). This rle, promulgated by the SEC, entitles
all tenderors to the highest price paid for any shares tendered in the tender offer. See id.
50. See Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 809.
51. Seeid.at8lO.
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Ultimately, Sun successfully obtained the 34% of Becton's shares it
desired.52
Thereafter, Becton commenced litigation that resulted in judgment
against Sun for failing to comply with the disclosure requirements of
§ 14(d) of the Exchange Act." Among his many defenses, Dickinson
argued that the acquisition of shares was privately negotiated, and
therefore not subject to the provisions of the Williams Act. The court,
using a seven-factor test, held that the transaction constituted a tender
offer, and concluded that the Williams Act governed the transaction at
issue.55
The court specified the following factors as relevant to determining
whether a tender offer existed:
(1) [A]ctive and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the
shares of an issuer; (2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of
the issuer's stock; (3) offer to purchase made at a premium over the
prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather than
negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number of
shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number to be purchased; (6)
offer open only a limited period of time; (7) offeree subjected to
pressure to sell his stock.56
When all of the factors are present in a specified transaction, there
is a strong indication that a tender offer exists. 7 Significantly, however,
the court explained that the aforementioned factors do not all need to be
present for a tender offer to exist. 8 Depending upon the circumstances of
a particular case, the court may afford more weight to some factors
because they "may be more compelling and determinative than ...

52. See id.
53. See id. at 826. Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act requires any parties offering to purchase
more than 5% of a class of securities to file public statements containing certain information. See 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1994); see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Williams Act).
54. See Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 819.
55. See id. at 824, 826.
56. Id. at 823-24. The SEC developed the test set forth in Wellman. See Hoover Co. v. Fuqua
Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,145, at 96,148 n.3 (N.D.
Ohio June 11, 1979). However, the SEC listed an eighth factor: "Whether public announcements of
a purchasing program concerning the target company precede or accompany a rapid accumulation
of large amounts of target company securities." Id. at 196,148. The Wellman court did not consider
this factor because it was not pertinent based on the facts before the court. See Wellman, 475
F. Supp. at 824.
57. See Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 824.
58. See id.
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others."59 After determining that all seven factors were present in the
case before it, the court concluded that a tender offer existed."
While the Welhnan test is widely accepted," it is not without its

critics. One court rejected the test stating that "the elevation of such a list
to a mandatory

'litmus test' appears to be both unwise and

unnecessary." ' 2 That court believed the test was too variabler" and
instead opted to analyze the statutory purpose of § 14(d) of the Exchange

Act to determine whether a tender offer existed." Interestingly,
immediately after rejecting the Wellinan test, the court informally
discussed all of the factors comprising the Welhnan test and concluded
that because none of the factors had been met, the offerees were not
entitled to the protection of the Williams Act."'
2. The S-G Securities Test

Many courts have also used a test derived in S-G Securities, Inc. i'
Fuqua Investment Co.65 to determine if a tender offer exists. In S-G

Securities, Fuqua Investment Company ("FIC") sought control of S-G
Securities, Inc. ("$-").67 On two separate occasions, FIC issued a public
announcement over the Dow Jones broad tape concerning a possible
tender offer for S-G common stock," however, S-G rejected the offer

59. Id.
60. See id. at 826.
61. For additional applications of the Wellman test. see SEC v. Carter Ha%%ley Hale Stores,
Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985); Polinsky v. MCA Inc., 680 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (9th Cir.
1982); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271,286 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing Loth the ell'lnn
and S-G Securities tests); Energy Ventures, Inc. v. Appalachian Co.. 587 F. Supp. 734, 74042 (D.
Del. 1984); Zuckerman v. Franz, 573 F. Supp. 351, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Ludlow Corp. %.Tyco

Labs., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 62, 67-68 (D. Mass. 1981); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294.
302-03 (D. Del. 1981); E.H.L of Fa., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 499 F. Supp. 1053. 1065 & n.8
(E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 652 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1981); Brascan Ltd. v. Edpzer Equities, Ltd, 477
F. Supp. 773, 791-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (analyzing the transaction pursuant to the SEC test as if it
were authoritative).
62. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985). res'd and remanded
sub nom. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCaM Acquisition. Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
63. See id.
64. See id. The court held that the existence of a tender offer should be determined % hen:
[V]iewing the transaction in the light of the totality of circumstances, there appears
to be a likelihood that unless the pre-acquisition filing strictures of that statute are
followed there will be a substantial risk that solicitas will lack information needed
to make a carefully considered appraisal of the proposal put before them.
Id.
65. See id. at 57-58.
66. 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978).
67. Seeid.at lll9.
68. See id.at 19-20.
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both times.6 9 Approximately two months after the initial public offer to
buy S-G's shares, FIC announced that it not only had acquired 28.5% of
S-G's shares, but that it intended to gain "operating" control of S-G in a
series of privately negotiated transactions and open market purchases.
One of the principal issues before the court was whether FIC's
stock purchases were subject to the filing and disclosure provisions of
the Williams Act.7' The court recognized that the transactions at issue
did not fall within the traditional definition of a tender offer, but it also
recognized that the Williams Act is liberally interpreted where the
transactions at issue pose the same potential dangers that the Williams
Act was designed to prevent.72
The court noted the significance of the widely publicized press
announcements that preceded FIC's purchases when it stated that "[t]his
publicity created a risk of the pressure on sellers that the disclosure and
remedial tender offer provisions of the Williams Act were designed to
prevent."73 In enjoining FIC from voting those shares it obtained, or from
acquiring additional shares until it offered rescission for certain
purchases, the court developed a two-part test to determine whether a
tender offer exists. 74 The court held that a tender offer exists when there
is:
1) [A] publicly announced intention by the purchaser to acquire a
substantial block of the stock of the target company for purposes of
acquiring control thereof, and
2) a subsequent rapid acquisition by the purchaser of large blocks of
stock through open market and privately negotiated purchases[.] 7'
The S-G Securities test therefore focuses on the pressure that public
offers place on public shareholders to sell their securities quickly and
without adequate information. 76 Similar to the Wellman test, the S-G
Securities test has been accepted by many courts." The Ninth Circuit,
69. See id. at 1120.
70. See id. at 1121.
71. Seeid. at 1123.
72. See id. at 1124.
73. Id. at 1126.
74. See id. at 1126-27.
75. Id.
76. See id.; see also infra note 77 (cataloguing case law interpreting the S-G Securities test in
this way).
77. For further application of the S-G Securities test, see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646
F.2d 271, 286 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing both the Wellman and S-G Securities tests); Univ. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Gladstone, 574 F. Supp. 1006, 1010-11 (D. Mass. 1983); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred,
Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,589, at 95,590 (N.D. I11.
July 13,
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however, criticized the S-G Securities test as "vague and difficult to
apply."' It stated that the test offers minimal value in guiding the issuer
through the provisions of the Williams Act.) In addition, the Ninth
Circuit typified it as "largely subjective and made in hindsight based on
an ex post facto evaluation of the response in the marketplace to the
repurchase program. ''"
As discussed, the courts have struggled to determine when a tender
offer exists because Congress determined that it would be best to let the
securities laws adapt to changing times. Nevertheless, courts generally
use the two tests detailed above to assist them in determining when they
should classify a transaction as a tender offer. While neither test is
perfect, both have a certain element of flexibility that allows courts to
recognize a tender offer in all of its various forms in order to necessarily
carry out the intentions of Congress.
B. The FederalSecurities Laws
Courts have had many opportunities to determine whether a
particular transaction constitutes a tender offer,"' however, federal
judicial interpretation of securities laws was not common until the mid1930s when Congress enacted federal securities regulations.7 Prior to
1933, securities were regulated, to the extent that they were regulated,
only by the individual states.' The necessity for the rapid introduction of
federal securities laws arose from the Great Depression.'
1. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act
The Stock Market Crash of 1929 resulted in a substantial loss of
investor confidence in the market." To regain the confidence of
investors that Wall Street once experienced, Congress determined that
1973); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248. 1251 (W.D. Oka. 1972k; see also Hoover
Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 7 96,145. at 96.149
(N.D. Ohio June 11, 1979) (discussing the issue of private shareholders as compared to public
shareholders in the context of the Wellnum test).

78. SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945,953 (9th Cir. 1985).
79. See id.
80. Id. (emphasis omitted).
81. See supra PartlI.A.
82. See AFrERMAN, supra note 16,at 7.

83. Most states had "blue-sky laws" that prohibited the "offering of securities if it is judged
not to be 'fair, just, and equitable."' Id. These laws focused on the investment practice of
"attemptiing] to sell securities in entities with not much more substance than the blue sky above to
unvitting investors." Id.

84. See id. at 1.
85. See CLARtSON, supra note 4, at 860.
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the time was ripe to enact federal securities laws.86 Congress' efforts
resulted in the enactment of two principal pieces of federal securities
legislation: the Securities Act" and the Exchange Act.8
In composing the Securities Act, Congress focused on distributing
securities as opposed to trading securities. 9 The primary goal of the
Securities Act was to "require issuers of new securities to disclose to the
public all relevant facts needed for an intelligent evaluation of the risks
and prospects of ownership" of the security." Because tender offers
concern the trading of securities rather than the issuing of new securities,
tender offers are governed by the Exchange Act. 9' Accordingly, this Note
focuses on the efficacy of the Exchange Act.
Realizing the need to regulate securities transactions, Congress
ratified the Exchange Act in 1934, just one year after it enacted the
Securities Act.' In enforcing the various federal securities laws, the
Supreme Court has had the opportunity to interpret Congress' intent on
many occasions. Significantly, the Court has stated that "[a] fundamental
purpose, common to these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a
high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."" To carry out
its intent, Congress created the SEC and afforded it the power to
administer the federal securities laws as well as prescribe rules necessary
to carry out such intentions. 4
While there were numerous motivating factors in instituting the
Exchange Act, 9 four are particularly relevant to tender offers and are the
focus of this Note. The four factors include: (1) mandating continuous
disclosure with respect to those securities registered under the Securities
Act; (2) ensuring regulation of the securities markets themselves; (3)

86. See S. REP. No. 90-550, at 1 (1967) (recommending federal regulation of securities
exchange).
87. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77bbbb (1994)).
88. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78/I (1994)).
89. See AFTERmAN, supra note 16, at 2.
90. 113 CONG. REc. 857 (1967) (statement of Sen. Kuchel).
91. See SODERQUIST& GABALDON, supra note 10, at 125.
92. See AFERMAN, supra note 16, at 1.
93. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
94. See H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 2816-17 (1968); AFTERMAN, supranote 16, at 2-3.
95. See AFrERMAN, supranote 16, at 2-3.
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preventing fraudulent activities and manipulation of the markets; and (4)
regulating the communications with shareholders.
While the Exchange Act was successful in boosting investor
confidence, Congress had yet to deal with another investment tool, the
tender offer.97 Thirty-four years after Congress enacted the Exchange
Act, fraudulent activities and communications with shareholders were all
too common in tender offer transactions. 3 Consequently, in 1968,
Congress realized the necessity for further legislation and, therefore,
passed the Williams Act."
2. The Williams Act
The Williams Act added §§ 13(d),'O' 13(e),'"' 14(d),"- 14(e),'tc and
14(f)'. 4 to the Exchange Act." The need for the Williams Act was clear.
Before the Williams Act, federal securities laws heavily regulated many
of the common takeover methods except for cash tender offers." For
example, stock for stock exchanges and stock tender offers'' are
regulated by the Securities Act, which requires they be registered.'3 The
Exchange Act mandates disclosure when someone initiates a proxy
contest.' 9 Nonetheless, an individual or company could make a cash

96. See id. Proxy contests are an example of regulating communications with sharcholders.
See id.
97. See SODERQIST & GABALDON, supra note 10. at 125-27 (describing the creation of the
Williams Act to focus on tender offers).
98. See S. REP. No. 90-550, at 3 (1967) (finding that with cash tender offers, "no information

need[ed to] be filed or disclosed to shareholders [rendering) the investment deciion-whthzr to
retain the security or sell
it-... in substance little different from the decision made on an original
purchase of a security, or on an offer to exchange one security for another").
99. See SODERQUIST& GABALDON, supra note 10, at 125.

100. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1994).
101. See id. § 78m(e).
102. See id. § 78n(d).
103. See id. § 78n(e).
104. See id. § 78n(f).
105. See SODERQUIST & GABALDON,S upra note 10, at 125-26. Sections 13(e) and 14(f) ae not
applicable to this Note and, therefore, will not be discussed. Section 13(e) applies to security
purchases by the issuer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e). Section 14(f) pertains to the election of a majority

of directors by a beneficial owner of more than 5% at a meeting other than one of security holders.
See id.
§ 78n(f).

106. See S. REP. No. 90-550, at 3 (1967).
107. A stock tender offer is a takeover method "in which the acquiring company offers its
securities in exchange for shares in the target" company. SODERQUIST & GAB.M Do, supra noe 10.
at 125.

108. See S. REP. No. 90-550, at 2-3.
109. Seeid.at3.
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tender offer"' without any requirement to file or disclose information
concerning their intentions."'
Through the adoption of the Williams Act, Congress ensured that
adequate information would also be readily available to the shareholder
when an investor made a cash tender offer."2 Moreover, the Williams
Act guaranteed that shareholders would no longer have to act hastily and
without full disclosure of information because it provided them with
sufficient time to carefully assess the relevant facts."3 Notably, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the Williams Act should be
interpreted broadly to effectuate its remedial purpose."" With the
knowledge that Congress intended to promote full and fair disclosure in
tender offer transactions, the specific provisions of the Williams Act can
be analyzed to determine whether, in fact, it has been successful.
Section 13(d) of the Williams Act applies to tender offers only
indirectly." 5 It requires a person who acquires more than 5% of any
security registered pursuant to the Securities Act to file a statement of
intention." 6 The statement must include, among other details,
information pertaining to the identity of the acquiror, the nature and
purpose of such beneficial ownership, and the number of shares of such
security which are beneficially owned."" The primary purpose behind
§ 13(d) is to provide notice to the current management of a target
company that someone has gained a substantial percentage of the
company's stock and to make it aware of this person's intentions with
respect to changing the corporate structure."' By requiring such
disclosure, a target company's management could best protect its
shareholders' investment interests." 9 Tender offers relate only indirectly
to § 13(d) in that it must be read in conjunction with other provisions of
the Williams Act.,20

110. A cash tender offer is a takeover method in which the acquiring company offers cash for
the securities of the target company. See SODERQUIST& GABALDON,Su1pra note 10, at 125.
111. See S. REP. No. 90-550, at 2-3.
112. SeeS. REP. NO 90-550, at2.
113. See H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 4(1968).
114. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
115. See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 10, at 126.
116. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1994).
117. Seeid. §78m(d)(1).
118. See Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,145, at 96,147 (N.D. Ohio, June 11, 1979); H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 3-4, 8.
119. See H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 3-4.
120. See id. at 10; SODERQJIST & GABALDON, supra note 10, at 126 (referring specifically to
§ 14(d) of the Williams Act, which prohibits tender offers for registered securities if success in the
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Section 14(d) of the Williams Act focuses specifically on the
concerns that gave rise to the Exchange Act, but in relation to cash
tender offers."' In pertinent part this section states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... to make a
tender offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders of, any class of
any equity security ...if, after consummation thereof, such person
would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5
per centum of such class, unless at the time copies of the offer or
request or invitation are first published or sent or given to security
holders such person has filed with the Commission a statement
containing such of the information specified in section 78m(d) of this
title, and such additional information as the Commission may by rules
and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.'

Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation
for tenders may be withdrawn by or on behalf of the depositor at any
time....123

In analyzing this section, it is clear that Congress intended to promote
full and fair disclosure of information when an investor makes a tender
offer. If an investor offers to purchase more than 5% of a corporation's
shares, the investor must abide by the disclosure rules set forth in
§ 13(d). 24 Additionally, under § 14(d)(5), as supplemented by SEC Rule
14d-7,' 2' shareholders may change their minds after deciding to tender
their shares.' 6 To wit, this permits a shareholder to withdraw his or her
tender at any time before the offer closes if he or she determines that the
offer is not a good value.

offer would result in beneficial ownership of more than 5% of the class unless certain filings are
made).
121. The Exchange Act was created to guarantee disclosure, and therefore, prevent fraudulent
transactions. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. Section 14td) of the Williams Act
purports to do the same in the context of cash tender offers. See H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 2-4.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1). As used in this subsection, "person" may includ, "a patznrship.
limited partnership, syndicate, or other group." Id. § 78(d).2).
123. Id. § 78n(d)(5); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (2000) (defining the time rericd in %shich
a shareholder may withdraw his or her tender as equal to the duration of the tender offerl.
124. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), n(d).
125. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7.
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:627

To further regulate the information disclosed pursuant to §§ 13(d)
and 14(d), Congress set forth § 14(e), commonly known as the antifraud
provision. This section states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request,
or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this
subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.'27
Essentially, two types of actions exist under this section. A
shareholder may bring a cause of action either where the tender offer
omits a material fact, or where the tender offer gives fraudulent,
misleading, or deceptive information.'2 s In addition, Congress
empowered the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations to prevent such
fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading acts from occurring under this
section. 29 In other words, the SEC has the power to enact rules to stop
fraudulent activities that Congress has not specifically covered under the
Williams Act. 3°
Significantly, Congress did not set a minimum threshold that a
person must acquire for the rubric of § 14(e) to apply.'3' While a tender
offer must be for more than 5% for § 14(d) to apply,'32 § 14(e) applies to
any tender offer, whether it is for more or less than 5%'33 The impact of
§ 14(e) is that it "adds a 'broad antifraud prohibition"' to the federal
securities laws.' The Supreme Court has accordingly interpreted that
Congress' intent in enacting this antifraud provision was to conclusively

127. Id. § 78n(e).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id; see also H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 7 (1968) (conferring express authority on the
SEC to issue rules and regulations in the public interest and for investor protection regarding the
prevention of fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts and practices, as well as rules and
regulations regarding a corporation's purchase of its own securities).

131. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
132. See id. § 78n(d).
133. See id. § 78n(e).
134. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977)).
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demand that all tender offerors make full and fair disclosure of material
information to those with whom they deal. '
The Williams Act has been successful in regulating tender offers
that seek more than 5% of a company's shares.'" Nevertheless, the
Williams Act, with the exception of § 14(e), does not govern mini-tender
offers. Thus, the question presented is whether mini-tender offers
specifically require further regulation.
]II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MINI-TENDER OFFERS

Consider the following hypothetical. Suppose you were the Chief
Executive Officer of RJBB, Inc., ("RJBB"), a publicly held corporation
with one million shares outstanding. Specializing in the manufacture of
cast stone, RJBB had recently escaped filing for bankruptcy and has
since made a substantial turnaround because of internal changes. Headed
out of the red and into the black, the future of RJBB was looking
brighter than ever and Wall Street was predicting good times for the
company.
Suddenly, one Monday morning, an influx of telephone calls and emails arrive at the company asking whether the company was merging.
One e-mail inquires whether the company was being taken over. A caller
asks, "did the Board approve the merger?" The inquiries go on and on:
"Is there an emergency shareholder's meeting?" "Someone wants to buy
my shares of the company and I have to respond fast; what should I do?"
"The offer is first-come, first-served and if I do not respond quickly, I
will not have an opportunity to tender my shares." "Why is someone
offering to buy my shares from me?" "What is going on?" "What should
I do?"
Hundreds, maybe thousands, of telephone calls inundate the
switchboard. They are calls from shareholders who want answers, and
they want them immediately. They want the answers that you do not
have. "A merger?" you ask. "What on earth are they talking about?" You
immediately put together a risk assessment team to ascertain what is
going on. The company's reputation cannot afford another setback right
now, not so soon after narrowly escaping bankruptcy.

135. Seeid.atll.
136. See Richard A. Booth, The Problem with Federal Tender Offer Law. 77 CAL. L REV.
707,712-13 (1989) (noting that "[alIthough the Williams Act may to soma extent have , hiewed thz
goal of equal treatment for shareholders, it ...can be easily evaded. and thus it d&-s not in faet
assure equal treatment among shareholders"). The Williams Act may be evaded, and its t.inefits to
shareholders lost, if the bidder chooses a bid structure not governed by the Act. See id. at 715.
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By early Monday evening, the risk assessment team discovers that
' 7
BH Holdings, Inc. ("BH Holdings") has made a "mini-tender offer", 3
for approximately 4.9% of RJBB's shares. Astoundingly, you determine
that the offer is for $11 per share, $9 less per share than the stock is
currently trading at on the market. The entire board of directors is
shocked and bewildered: What shareholder would tender his or her
shares for less than he or she could sell them for on the market? No one,
unless maybe he or she suspects BH Holdings has inside information, in
which case it is best to salvage some profit or minimize losses.
However, that is not the case here, BH Holdings does not have inside
information. BH Holdings is clearly trying to mislead and exploit the
shareholders of RJBB.
The risk assessment team determines that RJBB must issue a press
release to warn its shareholders of the deceptive methods of BH
Holdings, the offeror. The team composes a release that denies any
involvement in a merger, states that RJBB is in no way affiliated with
BH Holdings, and warns that shareholders should scrutinize its offer
because it is neither fair nor equitable and it is misleading.
Nevertheless, it is too late. Hundreds of smaller shareholders have
tendered their shares because they thought they were getting a good deal.
The shareholders figured that BH Holdings knew something about RJBB
that they did not; perhaps RJBB was really going bankrupt this time.
Those that had tendered their shares did not want to miss what they
thought would be at least some profit. The cost to RJBB amounts to
thousands of dollars due to the time and money spent on the risk
assessment team and on issuing the press release. Fortunately, the
company has escaped irreparable injury this time, but what about the
next time?
Is RJBB entitled to such detailed information as provided in § 14(d)
concerning a beneficial owner of more than 5% of the company's stock,
even though BH Holdings made an offer for less than 5%?'-" Moreover,
do the shareholders of RJBB have a right pursuant to § 14(e) to be
informed that the mini-tender offer proposed to them is for significantly
less than the market price?'39 These questions and more are analyzed in
the remainder of this Note.
137. See supranotes 2-9 and accompanying text (defining a mini-tender offer).
138. Section 14(d) applies only to tender offers that would result in the offeror acquiring more
than 5% ownership of any security registered pursuant to the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(1994).
139. Section 14(e) of the Securities Act requires that an offeror make disclosures regarding the
offer that are not fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive. See id. § 78n(e).
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Characterized as the "Holy Grail," some believe mini-tender offers

are the answer to "finding a way to make money with virtually no
risk.'' Mini-tender offers are a relatively new phenomenon, yet they
have become popular at an astounding rate.'4' The number of mini-tender

offers processed by the Depository Trust Company'42 ("DTC") grew
137% from 1997 to 1998."4
A. Mini-Tender Offer Defined
Because the concept of a mini-tender offer is relatively new, a

precise definition has not been established.'" While several
characteristics of a mini-tender offer are similar to that of a tender
offer, 5 mini-tender offers also have distinctive characteristics of their
own.'" In formulating a definition for a mini-tender offer, it is best to do
so through the guise of the Welhnan test' 47 and the S-G Securities test."'
The factors the Welhnan court set forth to ascertain whether a
tender offer exists that are common to a mini-tender offer include: (1) an

"active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares
of an issuer"; (2) the "terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable";
(3) the "offer [is] contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares,
often subject to a fixed maximum number to be purchased"; (4) the

"offer [is] open [for] only a limited period of time"; and (5) the "offeree
[is] subjected to pressure to sell his stock."' '
Three features pertaining to a mini-tender offer are, however,

notably different. First, and perhaps the most disconcerting difference
between tender offers and mini-tender offers, is that mini-tender offers
140. Martinez, supranote 5.
141. See id. (noting that in six months, mini-tender offers were sent to dozens of companies$see also Barbara Martinez, SEC Approves Request to Charge Feesfor Processing of Minitender
Offers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1999, at B 13.
142. The Depository Trust Company ("DTC") is the central depository for the nation's
securities. See Martinez, supranote 5.
143. Martinez, supranote 141.
144. Most likely, mini-tender offers will not develop a concrete definition for the samte reasons
no definitive definition exists for tender offers. See supra Part I.A idisessing congressional intent
to leave the term tender offer undefined).
145. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
147. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783. 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979, fft'd, 682 F2d
355 (2d Cir. 1982); see also supra Part l.A.1 (discussing the background of tender offers and the
eight factor test developed by the SEC and adopted by te Wellman court).
148. See S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114. 1126-27 (D. Mass. 19781; see
also supra Part ILA.2 (discussing the background of tender offers and the de'elopmcnt of the S-G
Securitiestest).
149. Welbnan, 475 F. Supp. at 823.-24.
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are made at a discount to the prevailing market price, 5' while typical
tender offers are made at a premium in order to induce shareholders to
tender their shares. 5 '
Second, in a mini-tender offer, the offeror generally sets a
maximum number of shares that he or she will accept," 2 whereas in a
tender offer, the offeror will not proceed with the offer unless he or she
obtains the desired minimum number of shares, although the number of
shares that is accepted is generally capped.'53 The threshold in a minitender offer is set at a maximum of just below 5% of the issuer's stock""
so that the offeror need not comply with most provisions of the Williams
Act. Because the primary purpose underlying mini-tender offers is to
make a quick profit, a mini-tender offeror does not need or desire a
substantial percentage of the outstanding stock. Conversely, in a tender
of the issuer's stock in
offer, the offeror wants a substantial percentage
55
company.1
the
of
control
gain
order to
The third significant difference involves the ability of the investor
to change his or her mind. Unlike a shareholder in a tender offer who
can withdraw their tender,'56 once an investor decides to tender his or her
shares 57in a mini-tender offer, there is generally no opportunity to recall
them.
Examining a mini-tender offer under the principles set forth in the
S-G Securities test is somewhat more difficult than under the Wellman
test because the former test is rather vague. Part one of the S-G
Securities test states that a tender offer is a public announcement to
acquire a substantial block of the target company for purposes of seeking
control. 5 1 While both a mini-tender offer and a tender offer are made
through public announcements, a mini-tender offer is not executed to
acquire control of the target company.'59 Generally, the primary objective
150. See Martinez, supra note 5.
151. See Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 823; Interpretive Release, supra note 7, at 46,583.
152. See Martinez, supra note 5; infra note 168 and accompanying text.
153. See Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 823.
154. See SEC, Mini Tender Offers: Beware of Offers to Buy Your Securities at Below Market
Prices (Aug. 19, 1999), at http://www.sec.gov/consumer/keyword/tminiten.html [hereinafter Mini
Tender Offers].
155. See, e.g., Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 805-06 (describing how the defendant sought to obtain
a controlling share of the company's stock through a tender offer in order to regain control).
156. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (2000) (permitting a shareholder to withdraw his or her tender
at any time so long as the tender offer remains open).
157. See Judith Bums, SEC Settles First-Ever 'Mini-Tender'Lawsuit, Dow JONES NEWSWIRES
(Aug. 19, 1999), available at http.//interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve@2.cgi.
158. See S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass. 1978).
159. See generally Martinez, supra note 5 (explaining that the reason one makes a mini-tender
offer is for a quick profit at low cost).
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of a mini-tender offer is to acquire up to 4.9% of a company's securities
and then
° sell them within a short amount of time to make a quick
profit.'1
Part two of the S-G Securities test suggests that a tender offer is
more likely to exist when the public announcement is followed by a
"rapid acquisition ...of large blocks of stock through open market

purchases and privately negotiated purchases."'"' Here, there is more
flexibility in analyzing a particular transaction than in part one of the SG Securities test. A court could justifiably conclude that an acquisition
of a company's security in blocks of up to 4.9% amount to a tender offer
because those blocks may be "large" when viewing the transaction in
light of the totality of the circumstances.
A mini-tender offer is not a transaction that traditionally falls
within the definition of tender offer; however, this is not fatal to
applying the Williams Act. The S-G Securities court developed its test
because it had come across a transaction that was not within the bounds
of a traditional tender offer, but was one that the Williams Act had
intended to govern.Is In due course, a court could, and should, logically
expand the definition of a tender offer to include mini-tender offers in
order to further implement the remedial nature of the Williams Act." 3
A court is likely to apply either the Welhnan test or the S-G
Securities test should litigation concerning mini-tender offers ever
proceed as far as trial. To this date, most investors, unless they have
been directly subjected to a mini-tender offer of this type, have never
heard of them.' The idea of tendering shares below market prices is
ridiculous to the experienced investor;c " however, as detailed below, it is
the inexperienced investor and the target company that need enhanced
protection under the Williams Act.

160. See id. Note that § 16(b) of the Exchange Act %%hichsets forth a prophylactic rle against
such "short swing profits," is a non-issue here. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994) (regulating profits
from a purchase and sale of security within six months). The person acquiring the shares through the
mini-tender offer is generally not an officer or director, and he or she is not likely to b2 a 1O?

beneficial omner at the time of the purchase and sale, rendering this section inapplicable. See id.
161. S-G Sec., Inc., 466 F. Supp. at 1127.
162. See id.at 1124.

163. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1. 8 (1985) (interpreting the VMlliams Act
to protect public shareholders); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332. 336 (1967) (holding that the
Williams Act is remedial because its purpose is to protect public shareholders).
164. See Martinez, supranote 5 ("The minitender-offer system is so basic that it's a wonder no
one thought of it before.").
165. See id.
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B. Making a Mini-Tender Offer
Because mini-tender offers attempt to buy a company's shares at a
discount,'" they have generated substantial controversy throughout the
securities industry. 67 The process of making a mini-tender offer "is so
basic that it's a wonder no one thought of it before.""' Using the
hypothetical set forth above, the simplicity of making a mini-tender offer
is easily illustrated.
Recall that RJBB was trading at $20 per share and had one million
shares outstanding at the time of the mini-tender offer. The mini-tender
offer made by BH Holdings, however, was for $11 per share, and it
sought only 4.9% of RJBB's outstanding shares. To commence the
transaction, BH Holdings would send a letter to the DTC offering to buy
up to 4.9% percent of RJBB at $11 per share. The letter might include
the name of the company making the offer, the offering price, a brief
statement indicating that the offer is first-come, first-served, and
instructions on how a shareholder can tender his or her shares.' 69
For a fee of $2700,170 the DTC would then forward BH Holdings'
offer to its participants, which include hundreds of banks and brokerage
firms.17' As part of their fiduciary duty, the brokerage firms must
disseminate the mini-tender offer information to their clients. 72 Upon
receipt of the mini-tender offer, the shareholders of RJBB must make an
"informed" decision about whether to tender their shares.
The process is that simple. Because the mini-tender offer is for
below 5% of RJBB, BH Holdings does not need to comply with most of
the securities regulations set forth in the Williams Act.1' Although this
simplifies the mini-tender offer process significantly, noncompliance

166. See Mini Tender Offers, supra note 154.
167. See Martinez, supra note 5.
168. Id.
169. See Barbara Martinez, Minitender Concern Agrees to Settle SEC Charges of Misleading
Investors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1999, at B7.
170. See Martinez, supra note 141. Interestingly, the DTC did not charge mini-tender offerors
a fee for processing the mini-tender offers until the SEC approved their request in February 1999.
See id. The DTC stated that the recent flood of mini-tender offers has required them to charge a fee
to cover the administrative costs. See id. However, in a tender offer, the DTC charges the tenderor a
fee to cover its administrative costs. See id. The DTC explains the disparate treatment by stating that
the number of acceptances in a mini-tender offer is much smaller and the DTC has found that it
cannot cover its costs without charging the mini-tender offeror a fee. See id.
171. See Martinez, supra note 5.
172. See, e.g., Conway v. Icahn & Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 504, 509-10 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 381 (1958)).
173. See supra Part Ul.B.2. It is important to note that § 14(e) of the Williams Act applies
regardless of the percentage sought through a mini-tender offer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
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with the Williams Act presents a myriad of problems for the target
companies and their individual shareholders.
C. The Significance of Mini-Tender Offers
By the time the shareholder receives the mini-tender offer, it has
been edited and shortened significantly by the DTC and various
brokerage houses." An investor cannot make an informed decision on
whether to tender his or her shares if the mini-tender offer does not
provide sufficient material information therein. The inability to make an
informed and educated decision has had a significant impact on both the
targeted companies and their individual shareholders. "'
The lack of adequate information in a mini-tender offer has resulted
in significant costs, both tangible and intangible, to the target companies
and their investors. Some of these costs include lost profits, money spent
on strategy sessions, and diminished investor confidence.' Table 1
illustrates a random sample of the mini-tender offers that have been
made with respect to various companies.'" As illustrated, the most
discounted mini-tender offer was 47% below the market price at the time
of the mini-tender offer, while the least discounted was l4%.' a The
importance of these numbers can readily be seen if applied to the
aforementioned hypothetical.
The mini-tender offer made to the shareholders of RJBB was for
$11 per share while the market price was $20 per share. This reflects a
45% discount to the actual trading price of RJBB's stock. Recall that
RJBB has one million shares outstanding; thus, 4.9% (remaining outside
the scope of the Williams Act) of that one million is 49,000 shares.
Assuming the market price remains at $20 per share, if the offeror were
to flip the shares within a few days, he or she would gain a gross profit
of $441,000.
This is a great profit for the mini-tender offeror; yet it is an even
greater loss for the shareholders that were duped by this fraudulent
practice. If that number is multiplied by the number of companies

174. See Martinez, supra note 5.
175. See Martinez, supra note 169.

176. See Telephone Interview with Debbie Bums, Manager Investor Rclations, Friendly*s Ice
Cream Corp., Inc. (Sept. 1, 1999); Telephone Interview with Mark Southhurst, Vice-Prenident,
General Counsel, and Secretary, Greyhound Lines (Sept. 1, 1999).
177. See infra app. tbLl.
178. See infra app. tbl.
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making mini-tender offers,'7 9 the profits rise to millions of dollars. More
significantly, every dollar "earned" by the mini-tender offeror is a dollar
lost by the shareholders of the target companies.
The costs incurred by the companies and their individual
shareholders take on several forms. The most obvious cost to the
individual shareholder is the profit he or she would have made if he or
she had tendered his or. her shares at the market price rather than for
below the market price. The other costs incurred by the shareholder are
not tangible, yet they have the potential of affecting the stability of the
market in the long run. For example, the costs associated with being
exploited and defrauded are detrimental to an efficient market.'80
Common sense dictates that when an individual has been exploited, he
or she will be less inclined to trust or place faith in the cause of the
deception. Therefore, an investor is likely to be less confident in the
securities markets after being exploited and, ultimately, fewer people
will make investments, which will hurt the economy in the long run.
Not only are there costs associated with the shareholders, but the
target companies incur substantial expenses as well. Some of the most
burdensome costs associated with the mini-tender offer for companies
are time spent on conducting strategy meetings and developing and
issuing press releases. 8 ' Protecting the company's reputation and
reassuring the shareholders that the company is functioning well are the
primary reasons for these costs."'s Other costs include time spent on the
telephone with the SEC, broker-dealers, and other companies facing
mini-tender offers.'83 While recorded empirical data of these costs
appears to be nonexistent,' companies that have been subjected to mini-

179. One company alone made sixty-five mini-tender offers in approximately six months. See
Martinez, supra note 5.
180. See AFrERMAN, supranote 16, at 9.
For the public securities markets to flourish and thus for corporations to have
sufficient capital at a reasonable cost to grow and prosper, investors must feel confident
about the regulation of securities, issuers, and the markets themselves. Thus corporations
as well as investors benefit from a sound set of laws that are strongly administered and
aggressively enforced.
Id.
181. See Telephone Interview with Debbie Bums, supra note 176; Telephone Interview with
Mark Southhurst, supra note 176.
182. See Telephone Interview with Debbie Bums, supra note 176; Telephone Interview with
Mark Southhurst, supra note 176.
183. See Telephone Interview with Mark Southhurst, supra note 176.
184. See id.; Telephone Interview with Debbie Bums, supra note 176.
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tender offers estimate that responding to the mini-tender offer cost them
thousands of dollars. "
The number of mini-tender offers made is growing exponentially.
In 1997, 39 mini-tender offers were processed.' Just one year later, in
1998, that number grew over 1277% to 5372" In the first five weeks of
1999, 300 mini-tender offers had been received by the DTC. 3 If that
rate continues, a projected 3120 mini-tender offers will be made in
1999.9 Evidencing a direct relationship, as the number of mini-tender
offers grows, the costs to the targeted companies and their shareholders
grows as well. In 1998, the costs amounted to thousands of dollars."' In
1999, it will likely grow to hundreds of thousands of dollars. If the
amount of mini-tender offers continues to grow at the present rate, the
costs will exceed one million dollars by next year.
The time to act is now; the SEC must not permit these mini-tender
offers to continue. They are a fraudulent and deceptive practice that
results in the destruction of a company's reputation as well as in
substantial costs to the shareholders and targeted companies. Target
companies and their shareholders cannot afford to be attacked by minitender offers.

IV. THE SEC's RESPONSE
Thus far, the SEC has initiated three lawsuits concerning minitender offers: IG Holdings, hzc.,191 Peachtree Partners,'9 and City
Investment Group, LLC. 9" Additionally, the SEC has recently issued an
interpretive release, which attempts to explain what the SEC views as
185. See Telephone Interview with Debbie Bums, supra note 176; Telephone Interview vith
Mark Southhurst, supra note 176.
186. See Martinez,supra note 141.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. According to the available data, the number of mini-tender offers processed in the first
five weeks of 1999 was approximately sixty per week. See id. At that rate, approximately 3120
mini-tender offers will be processed in 1999. See ict
190. See Telephone Interview with Mark Southhurst, supra note 176; Telephone Interview
with Debbie Bums, supra note 176.
191. Exchange Act Release No. 41,759,70 SEC Docket 832 (Aug. 19, 1999) (order instituting
proceedings, making findings, and imposing a cease and desist order) [hereinafter IG Holdings
Order].
192. Exchange Act Release No. 41,760,70 SEC Docket 834 (Aug. 19, 1999) (order instituting
proceedings, making findings, and imposing a cease and desist order) [hereinafter Peachtree
Partners Order].
193. Exchange Act Release No. 42,919,72 SEC Docket 1536 (June 12. 20001 (order instituting
proceedings, making findings, and imposing a cease and desist order) [hereinafter City In%esrnzzt
Group Order].
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deceptive and manipulative practices associated with mini-tender offers
in violation of § 14(e) of the Exchange Act." While the SEC's actions
are a step in the right direction, they are, upon thorough examination,
clearly insufficient to halt the deceptive practices engaged in by deceitful
investors.
A.

Three Lawsuits and Their Limited Value

On August 19, 1999, the SEC instituted and settled the first-ever
lawsuit concerning mini-tender offers against IG Holdings, Inc. ("IG
Holdings") pursuant to § 21C... of the Exchange Act. 9 6 The SEC
claimed IG Holdings violated § 14(e) of the Exchange Act because it did
not sufficiently monitor the dissemination of the mini-tender offer and
that it failed to disclose material facts.'" The suit settled when the SEC
imposed a cease and desist order ("IG Holdings Order"), 9 ' and
subsequently accepted an offer of settlement from IG Holdings ("IG
Holdings Settlement").' 99
The respondent, IG Holdings, was an Arizona corporation that had
consistently been in the business of investing securities, primarily by
making tender offers. 2°° Over the course of approximately one year,
commencing June 1998, IG Holdings made more than two hundred
mini-tender offers. 20 1 In making the mini-tender offers, IG Holdings
included information such as the name of the target company, the size of
the offer, the offering price, the date that the offer began and ended, and
instructions on how shareholders could tender their shares."ra
These offers were prepared in one to two page documents by an
information services firm, which then forwarded it to the DTC.O Upon
accepting the mini-tender offer, the DTC then announced the offer
through an electronic announcement system.0 4 Thereafter, the DTC and

194.

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

195. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1994).
196. See IG Holdings Order, supra note 191; see also Martinez, supra note 169 (stating that the
SEC is beginning to crack down on mini-tender offers).
197. See IG Holdings Order, supra note 191, at 833.
198. See id. at 834.
199. See IG Holdings, Inc. Offer of Settlement, File No. 3-9980 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter 1G
Holdings Settlement].
200. See IG Holdings Order, supra note 191, at 832.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 833.
203. See id.
204. See id.
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the information services firm entered into an agreement to make the
offer eligible for the processing of acceptances at the DTC.: '
Many of the DTC's participants, generally investment banks, then
notified their customers, who were the beneficial owners of the stock
being sought through the mini-tender offer, of the proposed tender."
However, in many instances, the shareholders did not receive material
information from the investment banks concerning the mini-tender
offers.' ° For example, the investment banks did not always inform their
customers that once they tendered their shares they could not withdraw
their tender.OS Additionally, they were not informed that IG Holdings
could revoke the offer at any time prior to completing the offer.:
Shareholders did not always know the final price they would receive
from IG Holdings.1 Furthermore, the investment banks did not always
inform the shareholders that the offering price might not reflect the
actual market price."'
Specifically, the SEC opined that:
IG Holdings violated Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act because
the means used to disseminate its below market mini-tender offers
resulted in some shareholders not receiving material information about
the offers, including the calculation of the final price to be paid by IG
Holdings and the warning (contained in certain IG Holdings material)
that the offering price might not reflect the market price. That
information was material because a reasonable investor would consider
it to be important in determining whether to tender.:"
Accordingly, the SEC issued an order that IG Holdings must "cease and
desist from committing or causing any violation and any future violation
of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act."2 t3 Pursuant to the terms of the IG
Holdings Settlement, " 4' IG Holdings, without admitting or denying the
findings of the SEC, consented to the issuance of the order. While the

205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. Seeid.
212. Id.
213. Id.
at 834.
214. See IG Holdings Settlement, supra note 199; see also IGHoldings Order. suipra note 191,
at 1 (accepting the Offer of Settlement that IG Holdings submitted to the SEC for the Aministrative
proceeding).
215. See IG Holdings Order, supranote 191, at 832.
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IG Holdings Order may be used in future proceedings against IG
Holdings or anyone else, the IG Holdings Settlement has no binding
effect on any future actions brought by the SEC or in the courts." 6
Consequently, this settlement appears to amount to a token reprimand
and a promise not to violate the antifraud provisions again.
On the same day that the SEC brought an action against IG
Holdings, the SEC also issued a cease and desist order against Peachtree
Partners ("Peachtree Partners Order"). 217 The facts of this case are quite
clear. Peachtree Partners, the respondent, is a general partnership with its
principal offices in Phoenix, Arizona. 8 Peachtree Partners, during the
times at issue, "investing in securities, including equities, bonds and
limited partnership interests, primarily by making tender offers for such
securities. '1 9
The SEC initiated legal proceedings against Peachtree Partners
because at the time Peachtree Partners made a mini-tender offer for 4.9%
of Shearson Murray Realty Fund ("Shearson"), it already owned
approximately 1% of Shearson."0 The SEC found that "[b]ecause
Peachtree Partners would have owned more than 5% of the securities
after consummation of the tender offer, it was required to comply with
the filing, disclosure and procedural requirements of''Section 14(d) of the
Exchange Act and Regulation 14D. It did not do so. 21
The SEC issued a cease and desist order against Peachtree Partners
pursuant to § 21C of the Exchange Act, which prohibited them "from
committing or causing any violation and any future violation of Section
14(d) of the Exchange Act and Regulation 14D." 2 ' While the SEC
issued the order declaring these practices in violation of the Williams
Act, Peachtree Partners and the SEC settled the proceeding pursuant to a
prior settlement where Peachtree Partners neither admitted nor denied
the findings set forth by the SEC.'
Although the settlement technically has precedential effect, the case
against Peachtree Partners is materially different from what transpires in
most fraudulent mini-tender offers, and thus, is of limited value to the
issues presented in this Note. Peachtree Partners would have clearly
216. See IG Holdings Settlement, supra note 199, at 2 n.1.
217. See Peachtree Partners Order, supra note 192.
218. See id. at 834.
219. Id.
220. See id. Peachtree Partners acquired the 1%previously owned through a prior mini-tender
offer. See id. at 834 n.l.
221. Id. at 834.
222. Id.at 835.
223. See id. at 834.
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violated § 14(d) of the Exchange Act if it acquired more than 5% of the
target company's shares and failed to file a tender offer statement.
However, in most mini-tender offers, the bidder never acquires more
than 5%; therefore, violations of the Exchange Act are not so lucid.
Most recently, the SEC issued a cease and desist order against City
Investment Group ("City Investment Group Order"), John Barrs, and
Tigran Papazian (collectively "respondents")." The City Investment
Group Order alleged that the respondents engaged in improper conduct
in connection with a mini-tender offer for 2% of the outstanding
common stock of Tellabs, Inc. The improper conduct referred to
included "knowingly or recklessly disseminat[ing] materially false and
misleading offering materials." 6 Specifically, the "[r]espondents failed
to disclose that [City Investment Group] did not have the financial
ability to complete the tender offer, that the offer was contingent on
financing, and that the offer would be cancelled if the market price did
not exceed the offering price when the offer concluded.""
The SEC deemed the improper conduct violative of the materiality
requirement of § 14(e) of the Exchange Act because a reasonable
investor would consider the omitted information important in
determining whether to tender.1 As in the previous two cases,
respondents consented to the cease and desist order without admitting or
denying the SEC's findings." Therefore, while the City Investment
Group Order may also technically be used as precedent, its value is
inherently limited.
The terms of the IG Holdings Order, Peachtree Partners Order, and
City Investment Group Order make it clear that the orders have limited
value in subsequent mini-tender offer cases. The problems created by the
development of mini-tender offers have not been rectified and the
potential for further abuse of the Williams Act clearly remains.
B. The SEC's InterpretiveRelease

On July 31, 2000, the SEC's interpretive release on mini-tender
offers and limited partnership tender offers became effectiveF 3 The SEC
issued the release because it was concerned with inadequate disclosure
224. See City Investment Group Order, supra note 193.
225. See i at 1536.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 1537.
229. See id. at 1536.

230. See Interpretive Release, supranote 7, at 2245.
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under § 14(e), specifically, "that bidders are not adequately
disseminating the disclosure to security holders [and that] bidders are
not paying for securities promptly at the expiration of the tender
offer.""3 In offering guidance to participants in tender offers, the SEC set
forth a set of disclosure guidelines, which if abided by, will reduce the
risk that the participants will violate the antifraud provisions of the
Exchange Act.f2
The disclosure guidelines suggest that bidders should disclose: (1)
"clearly if the offer price is below the market price"; (2) "if applicable,
that the price may be reduced by any distributions or fees and the
amount, if known"; (3) "whether security holders have the right to
withdraw the shares they tendered during the offer"; (4) "whether
tendered securities will be accepted on a pro rata basis if the offer is
oversubscribed"; (5) "that if the target is aware of the offer, the target is
required to make a recommendation to security holders regarding the
offer within 10 business days of commencement";1 3 (6) its identity and
any affiliation between it and the target, if any; (7) any "plans or
proposals regarding future tender offers of the securities of the same
target"; (8) "whether it has the funds necessary to consummate the
offer"; (9) "all material conditions to the offer"; and (10) whether the
offer could be extended, whether the bidder intends to extend, and if so,
the length of any extension.-3
Similar to the aforementioned legal proceedings brought by the
SEC, the interpretive release is not likely to end the deceptive and
manipulative practices associated with mini-tender offers. While the
leading case on the appropriate deference afforded to administrative
agencies is Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,25 courts and scholars have not been consistent in their interpretation
of how it applies to interpretive releases. Some have given Chevron a

23 I.Id. at 2247.
232. See id. at 2249.
233. Id. In other words, the SEC encourages the bidder to send the offering document to the
target so that it can comply with its obligations. This suggestion is rather interesting because tender
offers first originated in part because of the secrecy in which investors could conduct them. See,
e.g., 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 2129. Now, the SEC is suggesting that a tender offer
should be disclosed to the target company, and the failure to do so could result in a violation of
§ 14(e). See Interpretive Release, supra note 7, at 2249-50.
234. Interpretive Release, supra note 7, at 2250.
235. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Essentially, Chevron holds that legislative regulations should be
afforded "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute." Id. at 844.
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restrictive reading, while others have given it a more expansive
reading. 6
The restrictive reading of Chevron contends "that Chevron

deference applies only to agency interpretations issued in legislative
rules or final adjudicative decisions." 7 A narrow reading such as this
has led many courts to conclude that when "an agency's interpretation is
embodied in another format, such as an 'interpretive rule' or a 'policy
statement' exempted from [an agency's] notice and comment
provisions," automatic deference is unwarranted.' On the other hand, a
more expansive reading of Chevron requires a reviewing court to give an

interpretation or policy statement that an agency issued without the
notice and comment process, if reasonable, controlling weight!"

236. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony. Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON,REG. 1 (1990) (advocating a restrictive reading of Chevron): Rus'dll L
Weaver, Chevron: Martin, Anthony, and Format Requirencnts. 40 U. KtrN. L REv. 587 t19921
(contending that Chevron deference should be applied to interpretive rules).
237. Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action
Letters: CurrentProblems and a ProposedFramework,83 CORNELL L REV. 921.97411998s,
238. Id. Circuits applying a narrow reading of Chevron to SEC Interpretive Releases include:
Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the government's argument that
Congress' failure to provide a definition of "nonviolent offense" in the statute gives tha Bureau of
Prisons complete discretion); Freeman v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 80 F.3d 78. 83 (2d Cir. 1996) (deClining
to apply Chevron deference to a Department of Labor interpretation because -'[u]ulike regulations.
interpretations [that are not promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Pronedure Act] are not
binding and do not have the force of law"') (citation omitted); Atchison. Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. Pefla, 44 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the notice and comment prozes is %hat
affords administrative rules Chevron deference), qo'd on other grounds sub nom. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe R.R. Co.. 516 U.S. 152 (1996); Kelley v.FI.
DuPont de Nemours & Co.. 17 F.3d 836, 841 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that Chevren deferece is not
applicable to an "agency's policy statements and interpretive rulings, %%hich. unlike agenzy
regulations, are not published for comment and do not have to endure other rule-making
formalities"); Doe v. Reivitz, 830 F.2d 1441, 1445-47 (7th Cir. 1987) (refusing to apply Chevron
deference because the documents at issue were interpretive rather than legislative and thus "are not
entitled to the same degree of deference commanded by the high.powered regulations reaieved in
Chevron').
239. See Nagy, supranote 237, at 974. Circuits applying an expansive reading of Chn-ran to
SEC Interpretive Releases include: United States v. LaBonte. 70 F3d 1396. 1404 (ist Cir. 1995)
("Chevron deference is the proper criterion for determining whether a guideline (or. for that matter.
commentary that suggests how a guideline should be read) contravenes a statute."h, rerd and
remanded by,520 U.S. 751, 762 n.6 (1997) (finding the statute at issue unambiguous, and therefore,
unnecessary to determine whether the commission was owzed deference); Varren v. N.C. M-p't of
Human Res., 65 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1995) (affording Chevron deference to the United States
Department of Agriculture's Administrative Notice although its position had not been formally
enacted in the form of a regulation); Johnson City Med. Ctr. v. United States. 999 F2d 973, 97576
(6th Cir. 1993) (giving "some deference" to an IRS revenue ruling); Wagner Seed Co. '. Bush, 946
F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[It simply is not the law of this circuit that an interpretive
regulation does not receive the Chevron deference accorded a legislative regulation.").
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In the instant case, the SEC issued its interpretive release
concerning mini-tender offers without proceeding through the formal
notice and comment process;2' therefore, the amount of deference a
court might afford it is likely to be inconsistent throughout the circuits.
Because the Supreme Court has not definitively weighed in on the
applicability of Chevron to interpretive releases issued by administrative
agencies and the circuits have taken inconsistent positions, there is
enormous potential for inconsistent rulings concerning what constitutes
fraudulent and manipulative activities under the Williams Act. Material
information under § 14(e) must be uniformly defined throughout the
United States jurisdictions so that investors are treated equally. It is time
to act preventively, rather than wait for the courts to disagree about what
information amounts to material information. Failure to do so will result
in substantial losses to investors and target companies through the
fraudulent practices of manipulative "businesspersons." The SEC must
rectify the problems associated with mini-tender offers in a manner that
will provide a concrete method of determining when a mini-tender offer
violates § 14(e).
C. Despite the SEC's Actions, Mini-Tender Offers
Continue to Be Consummated
Even in the face of lawsuits against those making fraudulent minitender offers and an SEC Interpretive Release, mini-tender offers
continue to permeate the business world. The continuing presence of
mini-tender offers provides concrete evidence that the SEC has not taken
sufficient steps to halt the fraudulent and deceptive practices of these
"businesspersons."
The same day the SEC's interpretive release took effect, TRC
Capital Corp. ("TRC") extended a mini-tender offer to NOVA Chemical
Corp.'s ("NOVA") shareholders."' TRC offered to purchase up to 3.3
million shares, or about 3.75%, of NOVA at a price of approximately
5% below the market value."4 NOVA responded to the mini-tender offer
by saying "'shareholder beware"' and did not recommend or endorse the
offer in any way. 3 A NOVA spokesperson suggested that the minitender offer was "'a win-win situation for [TRC], but lose-lose for the

240. See Interpretive Release, supranote 7.
241. See Kimberly K. Barlow, NOVA Warns Investors of 'Minitender' Offer, BEAVER COUNTY
TIMEs (Pa.), Aug. 4, 2000, at B9.
242. See id.
243. See id.
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stockholders.', 2 TRC stated, however, that it did not intend to take
advantage of shareholders, but that "'[t]he offer [was] designed to appeal
4 S In other words,
to investors who are holding odd lots in NOVA."""
TRC suggested that shareholders may in fact receive more money for
their shares if they tender to TRC because they will not incur high fees
and costs that may be associated with selling odd lots of shares if sold
individually." On November 17, 2000 TRC made another mini-tender
offer to Maytag for up to 2.75 million shares, approximately 3.4% of the
total equity.247 The day prior to the mini-tender offer, the market
reflected a value of 11.7% more than the price offered by TRC in the
mini-tender offer. 2'
The two mini-tender offers by TRC clearly illustrate that the SEC's
prior legal proceedings and interpretive release are insufficient to end the
deceptive practices of unscrupulous "businesspersons." The SEC must
take concrete steps to stop the making of mini-tender offers and the
deceptive practices associated therewith.
V.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The SEC's lawsuits against IG Holdings, Peachtree Partners, and
City Investment Group and its interpretive release are all steps in the
right direction. These actions are inadequate, however, to stop the
fraudulent practices related to mini-tender offers. Furthermore, only
some courts afford the SEC's interpretive releases deference.U The
failure of the SEC to issue controlling authority will only result in an
enormous amount of litigation leading to inconsistent circuit rulings and
a needless waste of money. The time is ripe for the SEC to issue new
regulations concerning mini-tender offers.
The exponential increase in mini-tender offers in the past few years
is cause for substantial concern. As discussed above, mini-tender offers
present a myriad of problems that the Williams Act does not address.
This Note proposes two solutions, which would work most effectively if
used in conjunction with one another, rather than individually.
The first solution suggests that the SEC should enforce § 14(e) of
the Exchange Act more stringently by issuing a new regulation.
244. Id. (quoting a NOVA Chemical Corp. spokesman).
245. Id. (quoting TRC Capital Corp. president Lome H. Albaum).
246. See id.
247. See Nikkd Tait, Maytag Warns on Mini-Tender Offer. FIN. TLmES (London). Nov. 18.
2000, at 8.
248. See U
249. See discussion supra Part LV.B.
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Congress intentionally designed the antifraud provision to have a broadsweeping effect over the securities industry.20 To carry out its objectives
under this section, Congress explicitly authorized the SEC to promulgate
and enforce those rules that are necessary.2' Specifically, the SEC
should enact a regulation that (1) makes the failure to disclose the minitender offer price and the market price in the mini-tender offer
fraudulent per se, and (2) makes the failure to afford a shareholder
withdrawal rights fraudulent per se. Arguments against such a solution
are easily eliminated. For example, some may argue that this solution is
not practical in that daily fluctuations of the market price prevent a minitender offeror from specifying the exact market price, or that the market
price of a thinly traded security is difficult to establish. These
"problems" are hardly insurmountable, as discussed below.
The second solution focuses on the investment banks rather than
the mini-tender offeror. Investment banks have a fiduciary duty to
disclose information to their clients concerning their portfolios. 2 In
accord with their fiduciary duties to their customers, this solution
proposes a new regulation that requires investment banks to carefully
scrutinize the mini-tender offer and make the shareholders aware of
information that is reasonably suspect. Ideally, this would include
information such as a discounted mini-tender offer. Arguably, this
solution is somewhat problematic in that its focus is not on the
troublemaker; but, as addressed below, this too is disposed of easily.
A.

Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act Requires Stricter
Enforcement via a New Regulation

This solution suggests that the SEC issue a regulation to enforce
§ 14(e) of the Exchange Act, the antifraud provision, more stringently to
cover substantive acts of fraud. While it may not appear that the acts of
IG Holdings and companies acting in similar capacities are facially
fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading, they clearly are, upon thorough
examination.
Congress enacted § 14(e) to alleviate the chicanery involved in
making tender offers. 3 This antifraud provision specifically prohibits a
tender offeror from engaging in fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative

250. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
251. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
252. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958); see also Conway v. Icahn & Co.,
Inc., 16 F.3d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1994); 11 N.Y. JUR. 2D Brokers § 45 (1981).
253. See discussion supraPart .B.2.
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acts regardless of the percentage of shares sought or obtained.' It also
prohibits the tender offeror from omitting material facts that would make
statements misleading. 5-Furthermore, Congress empowered the SEC to
prescribe rules necessary to carry out its intentions under this section.2"
In its interpretive release, the SEC listed several activities that it deemed
fraudulent pursuant to § 14(e).' - But, as discussed earlier, courts do not
necessarily afford interpretive releases controlling deference. Adopting a
regulation, which must be afforded controlling deference under Chevron,
that explicitly illustrates fraudulent activity under § 14(e), therefore, may
best rectify the problems associated with mini-tender offers.
The SEC could effectively curtail mini-tender offers if it
incorporated the following suggestions into a new regulation. The
market price of a company's shares is clearly a material fact necessary to
make the statements of the mini-tender offeror not misleading because a
reasonable investor would consider it to be important in determining
whether to tender. -€ The intentional failure to state the market price is
also a fraudulent practice because no one would tender his or her shares
for less money than he or she could receive somewhere else."' The
predominant factor a shareholder weighs in deciding whether to tender
his or her shares is the offering price. If the price is high enough to
satisfy the shareholder's desire, then the shareholder will tender his or
her shares. But if the mini-tender offer does not state the market price,
the shareholder may not know that the offering price is inequitable." '
When a shareholder receives a mini-tender offer, a logical and
reasonable assumption is that the offering price is at a premium to the
market price. 6' Premiums are frequently associated with a tender offer
because they provide a shareholder with an incentive to become
involved in matters of corporate concern.: 2 Otherwise, a shareholder
who generally owns such a small percentage of the company, recognizes

254. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).

255. See id.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See
See
See
See

id.
Interpretive Release, supra note 7.
id. at 2248; IG Holdings Order, supranote 191, at 833.
Interpretive Release, supranote 7. at 2248. That is, assuming all other aspects being

equal. Seek. at 2249 (inferring that any offer made below market value is based on unusual facts).
260. See id. at 2248.

261. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783. 824. (S.D.N.Y. 1979). aff'd, 682 F.2d 355
(2d Cir. 1982); Interpretive Release, supra note 7, at 2248.

262. See KLEw & RAMSEYER, supra note 4, at 484 (explaining that %%henshareholders have a
small stake in a corporation, they often have no economic incentive to become %,ell-inform:J ataut

corporate disputes).
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that his or her vote has little, if any, significance. 63 The premium offered
in a tender offer provides shareholders with such an incentive to become
active and tender their shares.
Requiring the mini-tender offeror to disclose the market price
would eliminate many, if not all, of the problems associated with minitender offers. If the mini-tender offer is distributed to the shareholders
with the offering price and the market price, the shareholder will be able
to determine if the offer is a good value. 6 The shareholder can then
make an informed decision while having all of the material facts
concerning the offer. The predominant argument concerning mini-tender
offers is that they are misleading; specifically, that they offer to buy a
person's shares for below the market price. Mandating market price
disclosure in conjunction with the offering price clearly eliminates this
problem.
Moreover, a regulation concerning § 14(e) should make the failure
to provide withdrawal rights a violation of § 14(e) fraudulent per se.
§ 14(d)(5), as supplemented by SEC Rule 14d-7, affords shareholders
the right to change their minds after deciding to tender their shares so
long as the offer remains open. 26However, as discussed earlier, § 14(d)
only applies to tender offers that acquire more than 5% of a target
company's shares.2 6 There appears to be no plausible reason why a
shareholder should not be afforded this same withdrawal right when the
tender offer is a mini-tender offer. Affording this withdrawal right to
shareholders will prevent shareholder exploitation, provided they learn
that the mini-tender offer is fraudulent before it closes.
Arguably, this solution is not unassailable; however, none of the
problems are fatal. First, some may argue that market prices are readily
accessible from numerous sources, and therefore, the shareholder has no
right to complain of exploitation if he or she did not investigate the
offer.267 For example, many national newspapers list stock prices on a
daily basis, and they are available almost instantaneously on the Internet.

263. See id.
264. This Note recognizes that there are other factors that must be taken into consideration in
determining whether an offer is a good value. See Interpretive Release, supra note 7, at 2249
(recognizing that other factors may exist that will cause an offer price to vary from a stock's market
value). For simplicity purposes, this Note will assume that all of these other factors are reflected in
the market price.
265. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (2000) (defining the time period
a shareholder may withdraw his or her tender as equal to the duration of the tender offer).
266. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5).
267. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 5 (describing how one shareholder who received a lowball
tender offer simply called his broker to see if he knew any reason why the shareholder should sell).
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These arguments
amount to the well-known principle of "caveat
emptor."2613 In other words, investors have the means to access the market
price of their stocks at their fingertips, and therefore, we need not be
concerned with those who do not investigate their offers.
While the principle of caveat emptor may appear to be a viable
argument, it can be disposed of easily. The primary goal in enacting the
Exchange Act and its subsequent amendments, including the Williams
Act, was full and fair disclosure.2 9 The Supreme Court has interpreted
Congress' intent as "substitut[ingl a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
' Therefore, the concept of
business ethics in the securities industry."20
full disclosure trumps any theory of caveat emptor.
Second, some may argue that the market price fluctuates too
frequently for the offeror to state an accurate market price on the minitender offer. A variation of the proposed solution may, therefore, work
more effectively. For example, instead of stating the market price, the
SEC should require the mini-tender offeror to give the last closing price
or perhaps a fifteen-day high and low quote. In disclosing a price range
such as this, the shareholder can determine if the offering price is a fair
value that he or she is willing to accept. Although no single market price
is given, the shareholder will have reasonable information to determine
whether the offering price is in the desired price range.
A third potential argument against the proposed solution is that it is
impossible to state an accurate market price for a thinly traded security.
The first proposed solution mitigates the effects of this problem
substantially. If a security is not heavily traded and there is no true
market for it, similar to the solution for the fluctuating market problem,
the bidder should disclose the last buy and sell bids on the stock or state
its last sale price.
While this solution places more responsibility on the mini-tender
offeror, it does not counter Congress' intent of full and fair disclosure."
However, understanding that shareholders must assume some
responsibility for their investments, the SEC can only mandate that minitender offerors comply with the full and fair disclosure principle to the
extent that it is reasonable. In other words, if the market is thin for a
268. Caveat emptor is "[a] doctrine holding that purchasers buy at their own risl." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 215 (7th ed. 1999).
269. See S. REP. No. 90-550, at 3 (1967).
270. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.. 375 U.S. 180. 186 11963) (emphasis

omitted).
271. SeeS. RP.No. 90-550,at3.
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specific security, the shareholder must assume some responsibility for
investigating a mini-tender offer to determine if it is acceptable.
Nevertheless, the mini-tender offer should still include the last buy and
sell price to determine if it is an acceptable offer for him or her.
Section 14(e) is a broad anti-fraud provision. The SEC should use
the provision to its fullest capacities and stop the fraudulent, deceptive,
and misleading practices associated with mini-tender offers by adopting
this proposed solution.
B. Brokerage Firms Should Scrutinize the Mini-Tender Offer
for Reasonably Suspect Information
Brokerage firms owe their clients a fiduciary duty to act in their
clients' best interests.272 As part of this fiduciary duty, this solution
suggests that the SEC promulgate a new regulation that imposes a duty
on the brokerage firms to scrutinize a mini-tender offer for reasonably
suspect information. As discussed earlier, the SEC in its interpretive
release, set forth the information it believes is pertinent in determining
whether the bidder is acting fraudulently in terms of § 14(e) of the
Exchange Act.
Simply stated, a broker's fiduciary duty should mandate him or her
to examine mini-tender offers pertaining to his or her customers'
portfolios for the foregoing information. While this solution tends to
remove the focus from the troublemaker and shifts it to a third party, it
does not appear to be unreasonable. Fiduciary duties are part of a
longstanding legal notion in corporate law. 3 Moreover, the costs
associated with this solution are minimal. In fact, there really are no
substantial additional costs because the stockbroker already has a
fiduciary duty to his or her clients to act in their best interests.'74 This
solution simply requires the broker to make his or her client aware of
any reasonably suspect information, something he or she should be
doing already as a fiduciary.
Shareholders use brokerage houses in many cases because they lack
sophistication in trading securities. In other words, many investors do
272. See. e.g., Conway v. Icahn & Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing the
fiduciary relationship between a broker and its principal); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 381 (1958).
273. See, e.g., 36A C.J.S. Ferries§ 3 (1961) ("The term [fiduciary] is derived from the civil, or
Roman, law ... [and t]he term 'fiduciary relation' has reference to any relationship of blood,
business, friendship, or association in which the parties repose special trust and confidence in each
other .... )
274. See Conway, 16 F.3d at 510; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 381.
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not know what they should be looking for when they receive information
regarding their beneficial ownership."' Therefore, this solution suggests
that the brokerage firm be current on the information available to its
clients and warn
them of potentially false, deceptive, and misleading
6
information.2
C. Conclusion
The Stock Market Crash of 1929 prompted Congress to enact the
Securities Act of 193 3 .' One year later, realizing the need to promote
full and fair disclosure in transactions involving the trading of securities,
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.m Approximately
thirty-five years later, Senator Williams introduced a bill that was
designed to close a significant gap in investor protection. Congress
enacted the Williams Act in 1968, which added several sections to the
Exchange Act that focused on the regulation of cash tender offers.
Today, a gap remains in the federal securities laws that the SEC,
using the authority delegated to it by Congress, must rectify before
companies throughout the country are irreparably damaged and
hundreds of thousands of shareholders are further defrauded. There is
only one reason why a mini-tender offeror would fail to include the
market price (or a market price range) in the mini-tender offer and not
afford shareholders withdrawal rights: to mislead investors into
believing that the offer is a good value that they should accept.
The proposed solutions, new regulations to enforce § 14(e) more
strictly and imposing a fiduciary duty on the investment banks to
scrutinize mini-tender offers for reasonably suspect information, close
the gap left open by the Williams Act. The costs associated with these
solutions are minimal. For example, a mini-tender offeror only needs to
place one additional sentence into the offer, stating the market price and
offering price. Moreover, none of the costs associated with
implementing the proposed solutions place a further burden on the SEC
because the mini-tender offeror is still not required to file a tender offer
statement. 9 Once the offerors realize that the offering price must be
275.

Investors who do not use brokerage fms can reasonably be assumed to posscss the

required sophistication necessary to ascertain whether the information in a mini-tender offer is
reasonably suspect.
276. Obviously, if an investor does not use an investment bank to assist him or her in trading
his or her securities, this solution is not applicable.
277. See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 10, at 125.

278. See S. REP. No. 90-550, at 3 (1967).
279. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1994).
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disclosed, discounted mini-tender offers will likely disappear as a

trading transaction.
The SEC must act now. Congress intended full and fair disclosure

in passing the Williams Act, and omitting the market price from a minitender offer runs contrary to this intention. The potential for irreparable
damage is enormous and without proactive action by the SEC, this

problem will continue.
Russell L. Hirschhorn*
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APPENDIX

TABLE 1
A RANDOM SAMPLE OF MINI-TENDER OFFERS
MARET

DiscoUN"

WD-40 Co.'
GATX Corp.t

OFFER ($)
23.50
32.00

PRICE (S)
27.19
37.44

RATE ('%)
14
15

JDA Software t
Florida E. Coast Indus!
New Plan Excel Realty Trust

7.00
30.00
19.13

8.63
35.13
23.00

19
15
17

Lexington Corp. Props!

10.00

12.00

17

Inco Ltd."

-

-

COMPANY

MINI-TENDER

Asarco"

Cambior Inc."
Friendly's Ice Cream Corp.""
Spiegel Inc.'
[-]
[*]

17.3
26

4.00*
2.63*

6.00*
1.78

20
33
47

Indicates figures not available
Indicates approximate figures

t. See Martinez, supra note 5.
if. See Peter Morton, SEC Suit Fails to Halt 'Mini.Tender' Firms' Low-Ball Offers:
Settlement Reached: IG HoldingsSays It'll Be More Careful with Inforumtion. NAT'L POST. Aug.
20, 1999, at C6.
ttt. See Telephone Interview with Debbie Bums, supra note 176.
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